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Abstract 
 
The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic 
banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power 
on performance during the period 2005-2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on 
Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they 
have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO 
power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall 
negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but 
also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis has heightened interest in the relationship between the governance and 
performance of banks (Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013). The performance and accountability of 
the boards of directors and their attitude towards risk-taking and ethical principles in banking has come 
under increased scrutiny. The unprecedented amounts of losses recognized by some of the world leading 
financial institutions have brought into the spotlight issues concerning regulatory oversight, risk 
management, and disclosure. Many observers attribute the current financial crisis to failures in corporate 
governance, such as lax board oversight and flawed executive compensation practices that encourage 
aggressive risk taking (Erkens et al., 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Sharfman, 2009). Some researchers have 
lately focused on comparing the performance of conventional banks (CBs) with Islamic banks (IBs). 
Wilson (2010) notes the potential contributions of IBs and governance reforms in restoring credibility and 
stability in the international financial market. In contrast to the failures in the conventional banking sector, 
IBs did not announce substantial write-offs but have been rather resilient during the financial crisis (see 
Chapra, 2009, 2010; Green 210)2. While CBs faced significant difficulties, IBs seem to have fared better 
during the global financial crisis.  
There are significant differences between CBs and IBs. The latter provide Shari’ah compliant 
finance and have Shari’ah Supervision Boards (SSB) as a key feature of their governance. As Beck et al. 
(2013) note, IBs are prohibited from charging interest (riba) payments, are not allowed to engage in 
speculation, and are based on a profit and loss and thus risk-sharing model. SSBs are a significant feature 
of IBs and are considered as the ‘Supra Authority’ (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). They represent an 
additional layer of governance. Together with the regular boards of directors and routine executive and 
other operational committees, the institution of SSBs in IBs changes their governance into what we call 
“multi-layer” governance. This contrasts with the “single-layer” governance structure, which typically 
comprises the board of directors and executive/board subcommittees, in CBs. SSBs are an additional layer 
of monitoring and oversight as well as a constraint on operations. SSBs might restrain boards of directors 
and management from engaging in aggressive lending and major risk taking activities. At the root of 
                                                        
2 IBs generally comply with Basel II and follow Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) guidelines. IBs build up a profit equalization reserve, 
which is used to finance pay-outs during difficult years. They were neither exposed to toxic securities (Desai, 2008; Brewster, 2008) nor offered 
products like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage backed securities (MBS) due to Shari’ah prohibitions (Ahmed, 2009). 
Derivative products like credit derivative swap (CDS) are prohibited under Islamic law, Shari’ah, due to the existence of risky or hazardous sale. 
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Islamic banking is a theoretical commitment to ethical behavior, key manifestation of which is the 
adoption of profit-and-loss sharing schemes and prohibition of interest. The spiritual underpinning of 
Islamic banking together with the prohibition of interest suggests that IBs and their executives ought to 
be averse to unethical practice.  
This paper examines whether ‘‘multi-layer’’ corporate governance model in Islamic banking and 
the expected adherence of IBs to ethical behavior, which is theoretically the cornerstone of IBs, is 
associated with performance. Specifically, we examine the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate 
governance on the performance of IBs vis-à-vis CBs. Given concerns about the relationship between 
governance and performance (Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), we focus on the role of (i) 
Shari’ah supervision, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power in affecting bank performance. By using a 
matched pair sample of 86 IBs with 86 CBs from 25 countries for the period 2005-2011, including 2005-
2007 as pre-crisis, 2008-2009 as during-crisis, and 2010-2011 as post-crisis, we find that SSBs have a 
significant positive effect on the performance of IBs, but the results are mixed when we split our sample 
into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Notably, we find board structure (board size and board 
independence) has a negative and significant influence and CEO power (CEO-Chair duality and internally 
recruited CEO) has a negative, though insignificant, association with performance of IBs. For the CBs 
sample, we find board structure generally has a positive relationship, while CEO power has a negative, 
though insignificant, relationship with performance. Interestingly, interaction terms between board 
structure and CEO power variables seem to influence performance of IBs positively. We also provide 
additional insights from a survey of SSB members. The findings shed light on current practices and 
emphasize the need for well-functioning, independent and diligent Shari’ah boards, working in concert 
with the regular boards of directors, to better realise the ethical goals of Islamic banking  in practice. 
Overall, our paper demonstrates that SSBs positively impact on IB performance when they have a 
supervisory role, but that impact is negligible when it has only an advisory role. There is a need for some 
form of enforcement or regulatory mechanism for SSBs to be more effective. 
Our focus on IBs vis-à-vis CBs is important because there is renewed debate about the role and 
performance of IBs and some recent studies on stability, efficiency, and profitability cast doubt on the 
current state of IBs (see Abedifar et al., 2013; Ariss, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; 
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Hasan and Dridi, 2010; and Olson and Zoubi, 2008). Our paper differs from prior research and 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to examine the relationship between Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance. The 
literature relating to Islamic banking often tends to be normative and theoretical and there is limited 
empirical evidence on their performance, especially evaluation of the performance of IBs vis-à-vis CBs. 
We thus consider our comparison of IBs with CBs to be an important and timely contribution to this field 
and recognition of the paucity of research on the governance of IBs. In contrast to research which has 
focused mainly on the performance of CBs (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Francis et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Sierra et al., 2006; and Wintoki et al., 2012) or provides 
theoretical contributions about the uniqueness of IBs due to Shari’ah governance (Chowdhury and 
Hoque, 2006; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Hassan, 2011; Lewis, 2005; Safieddine, 2009), we provide 
empirical evidence on the effect of governance on the performance of IBs vis-à-vis CBs. In spite of the 
popular thinking that SSBs in IBs play a vital governance role, we are not aware of any study examining 
the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on the performance of IBs vis-à-vis that of 
CBs.  
Second, in examining the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on bank 
performance, we extend our base model by investigating the impact of Shari’ah supervision, including 
supervisory or advisory role of SSBs, on performance. We also investigate whether Shari’ah board is 
integrated or segmented with regular board. We also extend our base model by examining the effect of 
Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on bank performance in the context of small or large 
banks and large or small country. We thus augment the literature on the performance and governance of 
banks by offering an extended analysis on Shari’ah supervision and more specifically extend the 
comparative literature (IBs vis-à-vis CBs) such as Abedifar et al. (2013), and Beck et al. (2013) and Cihak 
and Hesse (2010). 
Third, the recent global financial crisis emphasizes the need for further research3. Using panel 
data we also examine if during the financial crisis the effect of governance on banks performance was 
                                                        
3 Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that while the failure to offload subprime risk has resulted in the credit crisis, the root cause of the crisis lies in the 
breakdown of shareholder monitoring and ill-conceived managerial incentives. Cornett et al. (2009) observe that bank performance has decreased 
dramatically during the financial crisis. They also note that corporate governance weakened significantly just before and during the financial crisis. 
Erkens et al. (2012) add that the focus of independent boards and institutional investors on short-term profitability has encouraged risk taking by 
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different. This enables us to capture governance effects that might only manifest in exceptional times. We 
split our sample into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods. By splitting the sample, we add to 
previous research, e.g. Aebi et al. (2012), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Ariss (2010), Beck et al. (2013), 
Johnes et al. (2013), and Pathan and Faff (2013), in terms of different effect of corporate governance on 
bank performance due to different time periods.  
Fourth, we complement the analysis of our panel data for IBs by adding the findings from a 
questionnaire survey of SSB members, thus providing additional insights into the nature and role of SSBs 
in IBs. Fifth, in measuring bank performance, we include a range of accounting measures as well as 
market-based measure Tobin’s Q to proxy for shareholder value.  Our research thus complements Adams 
and Mehran (2012), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012), Pathan and Faff 
(2013), Sierra et al. (2006), and Wintoki (2012) who focused entirely on CBs, whereas our study captures 
both IBs and CBs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the literature review and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 specifies the model applied and the description of the data used in the 
paper. The empirical results are reported in section 4 and the concluding remarks are in section 5.  
 
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Given the focus of our paper is on the effects of three important dimensions of governance (i.e. Shari’ah 
supervision, structure of boards of directors and CEO-power) on bank performance, in this section we 
provide a brief review of the pertinent literature. The scope of the review is limited to issues related to the 
development of hypotheses concerning the relationship between firm performance and (i) Shari’ah 
supervision, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power. We first discuss the performance and governance 
link before considering each of the these dimensions. 
Performance and Governance 
A sizeable literature investigates the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance 
including shareholder value in non-financial firms (see Stanwick and Stanwick, 2010 and Weir et al., 2002). 
The empirical evidence is however mixed (see Bauer et al., 2008; Gani and Jermias, 2006; Larcker et al., 
                                                                                                                                                                             
firms before the crisis, which exacerbated the losses suffered during the crisis. Weisbach (1988), Volpin (2002), and Parrino et al. (2003) advocate 
that CEO turnover is more sensitive to shareholder losses for firms with greater board independence and larger institutional ownership because 
these external monitors’ fiduciary duty is to focus on the creation of shareholder value. 
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2007; and Stannwick and Stanwick, 2010). A number of studies report a positive effect of corporate 
governance on the value of non-financial firms (e.g. Lee et al., 1992). Hutchinson (2002) for instance 
reports a negative association between corporate governance and firm value while Gupta et al. (2009) do 
not find that corporate governance affects firm value. The empirical literature examining the relationship 
between governance and performance in the banking sector is not very extensive. The few exceptions, for 
example, are Adams and Mehran (2012), Anders and Valledado (2008), Cornett et al. (2009), Francis et al. 
(2012), Pathan and Faff (2013), Sierra et al. (2006), and Wintoki et al. (2012). Sierra et al. (2006) suggest 
that strong boards improve bank performance. Adams and Mehran (2012) also find similar results for 
board size, but they fail to identify any relationship between performance and independent directors. 
Anders and Valledado (2008), on the other hand, report a positive effect of both board size and 
independent directors on bank performance. In contrast, Pathan and Faff (2013) report that both board 
size and independence are negatively related to firm performance. Cornett et al. (2009) note that higher 
stock returns and operating performance are associated with higher proportion of outside directors on 
boards. But Wintoki et al. (2012) do not find a significant relationship between board size or board 
independence and firm performance. However, Francis et al. (2012) report that better governed firms 
performed well during the financial crisis. 
The existing literature on the relationship between governance and performance is mixed – with 
some finding no relationship, while others finding either a positive or a negative relationship. Since our 
focus is on the relationship in the banking sector, more specifically relating to Islamic banking next we 
briefly review literature on this issue. 
The recent literature on Islamic banking compares stability, efficiency, and profitability issues 
between IBs and CBs. Beck et al. (2013) and Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) stress that there is no significant 
difference in business orientation between IBs and CBs, but Hasan and Dridi (2010) report contrasting 
results using data for global crisis. They find that business models in IBs are different from those 
prevalent in CBs. Abedifar et al. (2013) report that IBs face extra risks because of the complexity of 
Islamic modes of financing and limitations in their funding, investment, and risk management activities. 
Beck et al. (2013) and Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) note that IBs are less cost effective than CBs, but have a 
higher intermediation ratio and higher capital-asset ratio suggesting a more conservative approach to risk 
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taking. During the financial crisis period however IBs appear cost-effective (Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013). 
Hasan and Dridi (2010) also support the findings of Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) and suggest that the 
business models of IBs helped reduce the impact of the crisis on their profitability. Abedifar et al. (2013) 
and Olson and Zoubi (2008) add that since IBs experience excessive risks due to their business 
complexity, it helps them produce higher profits.  
Overall, existing research casts doubt on the current state of IBs and underpins the need for 
further research on the contributions and efficacy of Islamic banking. There is popular thinking that 
Shari’ah supervision plays a vital role in distinguishing IBs from the CBs and that SSBs play a vital 
governance role in Islamic banking (Lewis, 2005). The literature on Islamic banking (e.g., Chowdhury and 
Hoque, 2006; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Hassan, 2011; and Lewis, 2005) however is mainly normative and 
or theoretical, and there is a lack of empirical research on the governance of IBs. Research on Shari’ah 
supervision is not only limited, there is an absence of research examining the effect of Shari’ah supervision 
and governance on the performance of IBs vis-à-vis CBs.  
Shari’ah Supervision 
There has been unprecedented growth in Islamic banking and finance not just in Muslim majority 
countries, but in western countries too (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). The existence and operations of IBs may 
be differentiated at least theoretically from their conventional counterparts by a commitment to social 
justice. In order to contribute to the achievement of social justice IBs are expected to adhere to Islamic 
rulings relating to fairness and just earning of income such as profit and loss sharing, equitable distribution 
and the prohibition of riba (interest). A central feature of IBs is the institution of SSBs to help ensure 
compliance with the principles of Shari’ah. Advocates of Islamic banking argue that Shari’ah supervision 
enables IBs to contribute to social justice. The expected role and function of SSBs includes ensuring the 
operations of IBs do not involve dealing with any prohibited activity. For instance the Shari’ah 
governance framework for Islamic financial institutions issued by Bank Negara (2013: 1) declares that:  
“Shari’ah principles are the foundation for the practice of Islamic finance through the observance 
of the tenets, conditions and principles espoused by Shari’ah. Comprehensive compliance with 
Shari’ah principles would bring confidence to the general public and the financial markets on the 
credibility of Islamic finance operations.”  
 
Page 8 of 39 
  
The role and responsibilities of SSBs typically include: advising the boards of directors; providing input to 
Islamic financial institutions on Shari’ah matters to enable firms to comply with Shari’ah principles; setting 
Shari’ah related rules and principles and overseeing compliance to ensure that policies and procedures 
prepared by Islamic financial institutions are in conformity with Shari’ah and issuing verdict (fatwa) to 
create confidence with respect to Shari’ah compliance (see Safieddine, 2009).  
The key differentiation between CBs and IBs in terms of governance is the ethical underpinning 
and the existence of SSBs in Islamic banking. Working under guidance of SSBs, management of IBs have 
opportunity to raise operational issues with Shari’ah scholars who can examine them in the light of Islamic 
rules and principles and give specific rulings (Usmani, 1998). Contrasting IBs with CBs, Zaher and Hassan 
(2001: 159) observe that: 
“Under the Islamic financing system, investments or financing is targeted to the specific needs of 
the entity. Financiers or investors will need to satisfy themselves as to the reliability of the project, 
their lease rentals or the return promised in any financing deal. The investors and financiers have 
to exercise due diligence and careful monitoring of their investment. There is not much room for 
raising a variety of unsecured debts that are not targeted to the specific needs of borrowers.”  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In addressing our research question we adopt a multi-layer view of corporate governance in IBs, 
as depicted in Figure 1. The boards of directors, in the multi-layer governance of IBs, are prohibited from 
creating credit against credit due to prohibitions of interest (riba) under Shari’ah law. The boards of 
directors are also expected to avoid doubtful (gharar) investments in products such as CDOs and CDS.  
The religious beliefs and commitment to ethics also means that in IBs the boards of directors are expected 
to contribute towards social justice and avoid poor quality lending, aggressive risk taking while aiming to 
achieve social justice. Overall, the governance features of IBs with Shari’ah supervision as an additional 
mechanism suggest that IBs ought not to face the type of financial difficulties that have been experienced 
by their conventional counterparts. The role of SSBs in IBs means that their products are likely to be 
Shari’ah compliant and less risky. This may in turn have an effect on the performance of IBs. Our first 
hypothesis in null form is: 
H01: There is no relationship between Shari’ah supervision and performance. 
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Board structure and CEO power 
The literature on the role of the boards of directors has focused on board effectiveness in monitoring 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board of directors is a powerful internal governance 
mechanism affecting firm performance (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Khanchel 2007).  Board size 
negatively affects firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) because of coordination costs and 
free-rider problems and due to individual director incentives to acquire information and monitor 
managers being low in large boards (see Bushman et al., 2001; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).  In 
contrast, small boards are deemed to augment company monitoring capabilities (e.g., Jensen, 1993; 
Khanchel, 2007; Yermack, 1996). CEO-chair role duality is another aspect of internal governance. 
Scholars argue that role duality diminishes board independence, reduces flexibility of boards of directors 
and consequently reduces the possibility that boards can properly execute their oversight role (Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Krause et al., 2014; Li et al., 2008).  
The literature on the impact of board composition, specifically the ratio of inside versus outside 
directors, and firm performance suggests that boards dominated by outsiders, i.e. independent directors, 
are deemed better suited to monitor and control managers. A number of studies link the proportion of 
outside directors to financial performance and shareholder wealth (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Pathan and 
Faff, 2013; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). These studies consistently find that higher stock returns and 
operating performance are associated with higher proportion of outside directors on boards. In contrast, 
compared to independent board members, inside and affiliated board members are more susceptible to 
CEO influence. In this paper we capture two key aspects of board structure (board size and 
independence) and CEO power (CEO chair duality and internally recruited CEO). The existing evidence 
suggests that better governance would have at least mitigated some of the effects of the financial crisis if 
not prevented them from occurring in the first place. Our second and third hypotheses in null form are: 
H02: There is no relationship between board structure and performance. 
H03: There is no relationship between CEO power and performance. 
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3. Data and Empirical Method 
3.1 Sample 
For the purpose of this paper we have selected IBs based on their 2005 asset size and matched them with 
CBs based on firm size and country of registration. There were 147 IBs listed in BankScope database but 
due to data availability limitations we matched 86 IBs with 86 CBs. Our final sample covers the seven year 
period 2005-2011, including 2005-2007 pre-crisis, 2008-2009 crisis, and 2010-2011 post-crisis periods, and 
covers 25 countries. We merged data from BankScope, Datastream, World Bank country level 
macroeconomic data with hand collected data on Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance from 
annual reports of 172 banks for the sample period. The final sample consists of 1204 bank-year 
observations for 86 IBs and 86 CBs giving us 602 bank-year observations in each sub-sample. The sample 
distribution is presented in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
3.2 Measures of bank performance 
We test Shari’ah supervision and a set of corporate governance variables against bank performance using 
both accounting and market-based measures. Consistent with prior literature we include accounting-based 
variables return on equity4 and return on asset5, and market-based variable Tobin’s Q6. ROIAE is our first 
measure of performance of banks in terms of shareholders’ equity. Generally, the higher the figure the 
better is the expected performance, except when a bank is highly leveraged. ROIAA is our second 
measure. It is useful in comparing the efficiency and operational performance of banks as it looks at the 
returns generated from assets. Third, we use ROAE (return on average equity), which is a measure of 
return on shareholder funds. Again the higher the figure the better it is, except when a bank is highly 
leveraged. Our fourth measure is ROAA. This is perhaps the most powerful single ratio for comparing the 
efficiency and operational performance of banks as it looks at the returns generated from the assets. 
Finally, for the market-based performance measure we use Tobin’s Q which provides an estimate of the 
value of both tangible and intangible assets, such as market power, goodwill, quality of the management, 
and growth opportunities (see Pathan and Faff, 2013; and Weir et al., 2002). 
                                                        
4 We considered both operating income and net income to calculate the performance measures. 
5 Hutchinson and Gul (2004) and Gani and Jermias (2006) have implemented similar measures in their studies. 
6 Yermack (1996) and Weir et al. (2002) have implemented similar measures in their studies. 
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3.3 Measures of explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used in our model are described in Table 2. We include Shari’ah board size 
(SSB) as the proxy for Shari’ah supervision. Board structure related variables include board size (lnBoard), 
board independence (Board_indep), i.e. the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board. CEO power related variables include whether the CEO and the board chair is the same person 
(CEO_chair) and whether the CEO was internally recruited (CEO_internal). Company specific variables 
include company size (Log_TA), default risk (1/z-score), which is estimated using the average ROA plus 
capital to asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA. Following Pathan (2009), we use 1/z as a 
proxy for risk taking. Additionally, we also include equity to total assets (EQTA) to measure the level of 
protection afforded to banks by the equity, and net loan to total assets (NLTA) as an indicator of the 
proportion of assets that are tied up in loans. The higher the ratio the less liquid the banks will be. We also 
include measures for Big4 auditor (using a dummy) and disclosure of risk (Risk_disclosure), i.e. credit risk, 
liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk, and fund management risk. We give a score of 0.2 for each of 
the five items when disclosed, thus the maximum possible score is 1. Country related factors in our model 
include log of GDP per capita (lnGDP_percapita), percentage of Muslim population (Muslim_population) as a 
proxy of major religion of the country in which the bank operates, and the rate of inflation (Inflation). 
Finally, we use a dummy variable for IBs (Islamic) in the full sample, where 1 represents an IB, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
3.4 Empirical model 
We use the following model to test our hypotheses. 
Performancei,t=α0+α1* SSBi,t +β1* CGi,t +γ*Xi,t+*MEt+εi,t ……… (1) 
where Performancei,t is the proxy for the firm performance variable of bank i at time t,  
SSBi,t is the firm level Shari’ah supervision variable of bank i (IBs only) at time t, 
CG,it is a matrix of firm level corporate governance variables of bank i at time t,  
Xi,t is a matrix of firm level control variables of bank i at time t,  
MEt is a matrix of country level macroeconomic variables at time t,   
i,t is the error term, α0  is the constant, and  
, ,  and  are the vectors of coefficient estimates.  
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We use the model to analyze the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision (SSB), (ii) board structure 
(lnBoard and Board_indep), and (iii) CEO power (CEO_chair and CEO_internal) variables on bank 
performance (both accounting and market-based) using return on asset, return on equity, and hybrid 
(Tobin’s Q) proxies. The choice of big audit firm (Big4_adtr), risk disclosure index (Risk_disclosure),  
capitalization (EQTA), liquidity (NLTA), firm size (Log_TA), risk-taking (1/z) and country specific 
variables GDP per capita (lnGDP_percapita), Muslim population (Muslim_population), inflation rate (Inflation) 
and an Islamic bank dummy (Islamic) are included in our model. The description of the variables is 
elaborated in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
3.5 Estimation method 
We use random-effect GLS technique (see Baltagi and Wu, 1999) in this paper. There are several reasons 
for considering random-effect estimation suitable for our research. First, OLS ignores the panel structure 
of the data (Gambin, 2004). Second, the time-invariant parameter like religion cannot be estimated with 
fixed-effect. Third, the board structure (lnBoard and Board_indep) and CEO power (CEO_chair and 
CEO_internal) variables do not vary much over time and hence applying fixed-effect estimations would 
lead to massive loss of the degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005: 14; Wooldridge, 2002: 286). 
3.6 Descriptive statistics  
 We report descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table 3 (columns 2-10). We present mean for IBs, 
CBs and two-sample T-test (comparison of means for IBs and CBs) in columns 11-13. With respect to the 
dependent variables, we find that for the IBs sample (CBs sample, full sample) the mean ROIAE is 
10.44% (9.99%; 10.22%), ROAE is 8.63% (8.88%; 8.75%), ROIAA is 1.29% (1.52%; 1.41%), ROAA is 
1.24% (1.40%; 1.32%) and Tobin’s Q is 0.9256 (09589; 0.9411). T-tests do not reveal any significant 
difference in performance between CBs and IBs.  
We find the mean size of Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSB) is 4.1714. For corporate governance 
variables, the mean board size for the IB sample (CB sample; full sample) is 9.07 (9.088; 9.08), proportion 
of independent directors (Board_indep) is 0.3678 (0.1519; 0.2671), CEO-Chair duality (CEO_chair) is 9.9% 
(12.17%; 10.97%), internally recruited CEO (CEO_internal) is 19.37% (39.89%; 28%), Big4 auditor 
(Big4_adtr) is 78.29% (78.95%; 78.61%), and score for the risk disclosure index (Risk_disclosure) is 0.709 
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(0.650; 0.679). There is a significant difference between IBs and CBs in terms of board independence, 
internally recruited CEO and risk disclosure, i.e. IBs have higher risk disclosure and higher proportion of 
independent directors, but lower proportion of internally recruited CEOs. 
The means for the company specific variables for the IBs sample (CBs sample; full sample) are: 
log of Z-score measure of risk is 2.8006 (2.7504; 2.7751); equity to total asset (EQTA) ratio is 0.1786 
(0.1457; 0.1612); net loan to total asset (NLTA) ratio is 0.4797 (0.4739; 0.4768); while the log of total 
assets (Log_TA) is 21.0725 (21.3067; 21.1903). The T-tests (see column 13) reveal that there is a significant 
difference between the IBs and CBs only for the equity to total asset ratio (EQTA). The means for the 
country specific variables are as follows: lnGDP_percapita is 8.6888; Muslim_population is 79.2093; and 
Inflation is 6.5228. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Tests of Hypotheses 
(i) Accounting Performance, Shari’ah supervision and Corporate Governance  
In Tables 4 and 5 we present the regression results examining the effect of Shari’ah supervision, board 
structure and CEO-power on bank performance. Models 1-4 are for IBs (Panel A), models 5-8 are for 
CBs (Panel B), and models 9-12 are for the full-sample (Panel C). For each panel we present the results 
for the full period (Table 4). The Wald Chi2 tests are highly significant for all the models and the R-
squares are relatively high which indicates that the models are appropriate and the chosen parameters are 
good estimators of performance. All the models are fitted with Random-effect GLS (see section 3.5 for 
justification of the model). With respect to H01, we find that the SSB coefficients are positively related to 
performance for the full period, even though all of them are not significant, indicating that SSB influences 
firm performance (positively) (see models 1-4: Table 4). Overall, Shari’ah supervision has a positive effect 
on the performance of IBs.  
 The board structure variables (lnBoard and Board_indep) have a negative and significant association 
with performance for the IBs sample (Table 4). The results are quite consistent with previous research 
(Anders and Vallelado, 2012; and Pathan and Faff, 2013). Large boards are often deemed ineffective; 
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therefore, the negative relationship between board size and performance is not surprising. The interaction 
between board size and board independence has a highly significant and positive association with 
performance for the IBs sample. These results reject the null hypotheses H02 for the IBs sample. More 
independent directors in the board negatively impacts on performance. This may be due to the fact that 
either independent directors are chosen more for conforming to regulatory requirements or the market 
for high performing independent directors is limited (see Pathan and Faff, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012; 
Yermack, 1996). The CEO power variables (CEO-chair and CEO_internal) have a negative and 
insignificant, but the interaction between CEO-chair and CEO_internal has a positive (insignificant), 
relationship with the performance of IBs (Table 4). These results reject H03 for the IBs sample and are 
consistent with Aebi et al. (2012) and Francis et al. (2012).  
We find that Muslim_population, lnGDP_percapita have a positive association with the performance 
of IBs. Interestingly, we find that risk-taking behavior (1/z) has a significant positive and EQTA has a 
negative significant association with performance of IBs. These results indicate that higher risk-taking is 
rewarded with higher profitability and high capital protection is penalized with lower profitability. In 
addition, firm size (Log_TA) is also a significant variable affecting performance of IBs. Overall, we find 
that board structure and CEO power play a role in explaining the performance of IBs. 
In CBs, we find board structure variables are positively related to performance. In contrast CEO 
duality (CEO_chair) has a negative effect on performance. The effect of internally recruited CEO 
(CEO_internal) is mixed for CBs. Similar to our findings for IBs, risk taking (1/z) has a significant positive 
effect on the performance of CBs (see Panel B). These findings are generally consistent with Adams and 
Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012) and Sierra et al. (2006). 
Insert Tables 4 about here 
We further explore the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on bank 
performance by separating our sample into pre-crisis period (2005-7), crisis period (2008-9) and post-crisis 
period (2010-11) and report the results in Table 5. Models 1-4 are for IBs (Panel A), models 5-8 are for 
CBs (Panel B), and models 9-12 are for the full-sample (Panel C). As Panel A shows during the crisis 
period we find Shari’ah supervision (SSB) and CEO duality (CEO_chair) generally have a positive effect 
on the performance of IBs. The results provide some support for the view that Shari’ah supervision 
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ameliorates the negative effects of excessive risk taking and contribute to better performance of IBs. The 
effect of internally recruited CEOs (CEO_internal) on the performance of IBs during the crisis period is 
mixed. The board structure variables (lnBoard and Board_indep) for IBs are generally insignificant, but 
negative for the crisis period. For the CBs sample, we find that board structure (lnBoard and Board_indep) 
has a positive effect whereas CEO power (CEO_chair and CEO_internal) generally has a significant 
negative effect on performance during the crisis period. The differences between the periods could be due 
to changes in board structure between the sub-periods. For example, board size in full period is 9.47, 
whereas we notice a variation of board size across sub-periods as 9.31 (pre-crisis), 9.59 (during-crisis) and 
9.56 (post-crisis). The same is true for Board_indep. The distribution for full sample and sub-samples are as 
0.37 (full period), 0.32 (pre-crisis), 0.47 (during-crisis) and 0.32 (post-crisis). We find that both board size 
and Board_indep increases during crisis compared to pre and post crisis period. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
(ii) Market-Based Performance, Shari’ah Supervision and Corporate Governance 
Besides using accounting-based measures, we also use market-based measure of performance 
(Tobin’s Q) to examine our three hypotheses. Models 1-4 are for IBs (Panel A), models 5-8 are for CBs 
(Panel B), and models 9-12 are for the full-sample (Panel C). For each panel, first model is for full sample, 
second, third, and fourth models are for pre-crisis, during-crisis, and post-crisis respectively. We report 
the results in Table 6. The models include Shari’ah supervision (SSB), board structure (lnBoard and 
Board_indep), CEO power (CEO-chair and CEO_internal), and several firm-level (1/z, Log_TA, EQTA, 
NLTA), and country-level control variables. The Wald Chi2 is highly significant in all the models 
indicating that the models are appropriate and the chosen parameters are precise estimators of firm 
performance. All the models are fitted with Random-effect GLS (see the model justifications in section 
3.5). With respect to our first hypothesis (H01), we find that the SSB coefficients are positively related to 
market based performance, even though coefficients are insignificant, indicating that H01 is rejected.  
With respect to H02, we find that board structure variables (lnBoard and Board_indep) have a 
negative association with the performance of IBs, but the directions of the coefficients vary when we 
divide the sample into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. This could be due to changes in board 
structure, noted earlier, during the sub-periods. The coefficients are not significant and thus we fail to 
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reject this hypothesis. Our results here are consistent with Aebi et al. (2012), Adams and Mehran (2012), 
Francis et al. (2012) and Sierra et al. (2006). With respect to H03, we find that CEO power variables are 
negatively (significant) associated with the performance of IBs. This is consistent with the general findings 
of Aebi at al. (2012) and Francis et al. (2012). Although the results for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods offer mixed results both in sign and significance, we generally find negative influence of CEO 
power variables on market-based performance in IBs. The coefficients are generally insignificant. 
Interestingly, the interaction term (CEO_chair*CEO_internal) has a significant positive association with the 
performance of IBs for all period, but for the sub-periods the results are mixed. Overall, our results reject 
H03.  
For the CBs sample (Panel B) and the full sample (Panel C), we find mixed results similar to that 
we found when using accounting-based measures of performance. This is consistent with Wintoki et al. 
(2012). For all the sub-periods, we find that equity protection (EQTA) has a negative significant 
relationship with performance. We find Muslim_population and lnGDP_percapita generally have positive 
significant effect on performance in both the IBs and the full sample.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
(iii) Extended Analysis of IBs 
In this section, we extend our base model for the relationship between Shari’ah supervision, corporate 
governance and IB performance. First, we examine if accounting-based performance of IBs is affected by 
whether Shari’ah boards perform a supervisory or an advisory role. Second, we examine the relationship 
between Shari’ah supervision and accounting-based performance when bank size and country size vary. 
Third, we examine the effect of the supervisory/advisory roles as well as bank and country size effects on 
the market-based performance of IBs. 
iii.i Is the performance of IBs affected by whether Shari’ah boards are supervisory or advisory? 
We managed to hand collect the Shari’ah board data for 75 IBs out of the 86 IBs we have in our 
sample. Out of these 75 IBs, in 61 (427 bank-year observations) IBs the Shari’ah boards perform a 
supervisory role, whereas in 14 IBs (98 bank-year observations) the Shari’ah boards perform an advisory 
role. We thus extend our investigation to examine the effect on accounting-based performance when 
Shari’ah boards play either a supervisory or an advisory role. We present regression results for each 
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accounting-based performance proxy (see Table 7). Model 1 reports the results when the Shari’ah boards 
have a supervisory role whereas model 2 presents the result when the Shari’ah boards have an advisory 
role. We find the effect of Shari’ah supervision (SSB) on accounting-based performance is positive when 
Shari’ah boards have a supervisory role (Models 1, 4, 7, and 10). In contrast the effect is negative when 
Shari’ah boards have an advisory role (Models 2, 5, 8 and 11). We also find that board structure (lnBoard 
and Board_indep) negatively (significant), and CEO power (CEO_chair and CEO_internal) negatively 
(insignificant) influence accounting-based performance. The coefficients for the board structure variables 
are highly significant when Shari’ah boards have a supervisory role. These results suggest that Shari’ah 
supervision is an important instrument affecting the performance of IBs, but the effect could be positive 
or negative depending on whether Shari’ah boards have a supervisory or an advisory role.  
We further examine the interaction between Shari’ah supervision (SSB) and strong board7 and 
CEO power8 (SSB*Strong_Board, SSB*CEO_Power) for IBs. The results are reported in models 3, 6, 9 and 
12. The coefficients do not have similar signs and are not significant. Therefore, we conclude Shari’ah 
boards and regular boards are segmented. The coefficients for Shari’ah supervision (SSB), board structure 
(lnBoard and Board_indep) and CEO power (CEO_chair and CEO_internal) provide similar interpretations as 
those obtained from results when Shari’ah boards have a supervisory role (i.e. same as Models 1, 4, 7, and 
10). We also find that firm-level variables risk taking (1/z) has a positive, EQTA has a negative, whereas 
country-level variables Muslim_population and lnGDP_percapita have a positive influence on accounting-
based performance. The results are consistent with the earlier findings we reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Overall, we reject H01 and H02, but fail to reject H03. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
iii.ii) Does bank size or country size matter for the impact of Shari’ah supervision on IBs performance?  
 We investigate the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on accounting-based 
performance when bank size and country size differ. In Table 8 we report the results with variation in 
bank size (Panels A and B) and country size (Panel C and D). We define large (small) banks as those with 
higher (lower) than median asset-size and big (small) countries as those with higher (lower) than median 
country GDP. We find that Shari’ah supervision (SSB) has a significant positive, whereas board 
                                                        
7 We define strong board as board size less than median and board independence greater than median. 
8 CEO power is defined as CEO being the chair of the board as well as being internally recruited. 
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independence (Board_indep) has a significant negative, association with accounting-based performance 
when IBs are large (Panel A). We also find that in large IBs, CEO-chair duality (CEO_chair) has a positive, 
whereas internally recruited CEO (CEO_internal) has a significant negative, association with accounting-
based performance. Overall, we strongly reject H01 when IBs are large. The results are inconclusive for 
small IBs and country differences. We find board structure has a significant negative association with 
performance in small countries. Thus, we reject H02 for small countries. We also reject H03 (partially) when 
the country is small, but the results are inconclusive for other differences.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
iii.iii) Does role of SSB, bank and country size affect market-based performance of IBs? 
Similar to the analysis we reported above (see Tables 7 and 8), we further examine the 
effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance this time using market-based 
performance instead of accounting-based performance. The results are reported in Table 9. Panel 
A reports the results when the Shari’ah boards have either a supervisory or an advisory role and 
the interaction between Shari’ah and regular boards. Similar to our findings when using 
accounting-based performance, we find SSB has a significant positive effect on the market-based 
performance of IBs when Shari’ah boards have a supervisory role. The effect is negative, though 
not significant, when they have an advisory role. Interestingly, board structure (lnBoard and 
Board_indep) and CEO-power (CEO_chair and CEO_internal) have a negative effect on market-based 
performance of IBs when Shari’ah boards have a supervisory role. Except for CEO-internal, the 
coefficients however are not significant. The interaction between SSB and strong board is 
negative and significant, whereas the interaction between SSB and CEO power is positive and 
not significant. This suggests that the Shari’ah boards and regular boards are segmented in IBs. 
The firm-level and country-level control variables produce mixed results and are dependent on 
whether Shari’ah boards have a supervisory or an advisory role.  
In Table 9 (Panels B and C) we report the results for the effect of Shari’ah supervision and 
corporate governance on market-based performance when bank size and country size differ. The 
coefficients for SSB, board structure and CEO-power variables are mixed when we split the 
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sample based on bank size and country size. We find that SSB has as positive association with 
performance in both large banks and small banks as well as in large country and small country 
samples. The association is significant for the latter. Overall, we reject H01 when Shari’ah boards 
paly a supervisory role. Our results for H02 and H03 are inconclusive.   
Insert Table 9 about here 
(iv) Robustness Checks 
iv.i Two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
We use the two-step system GMM approach adopted by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) for endogeneity tests. This approach allows us to treat all the explanatory variables as 
endogenous and orthogonally use their past values as their respective instruments. It also creates a 
matching equation of the first differences of all variables and estimates the model via GMM using the 
lagged values of the right-hand side variables. First differencing eliminates unobserved heterogeneity and 
omitted variable bias. This approach means that we treat all bank characteristics as endogenous covariates, 
while treating the country and macro controls as strictly exogenous. We obtained system GMM estimates 
using Roodman’s (2009) ‘xtabond2’ module in Stata. 
The diagnostics tests reported in Table 10 show that the model is well fitted with statistically 
insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation in second differences (AR(2)) and the 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The residuals in the first difference should be serially 
correlated (AR(1)) by way of construction but the residuals in the second difference should not be serially 
correlated (AR(2)). Accordingly, the model fit and diagnostics in Table 10 show the desirable statistically 
significant AR(1) and statistically insignificant AR(2). Likewise, the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying 
restrictions tests the null instrument validity, and the statistically insignificant Hansen J-statistics indicates 
that the instruments are valid in the two-step system GMM estimation (see Table 10). Overall, consistent 
with expectations, the ‘system GMM’ estimates show that after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, SSB, strong board and CEO power are related to the performance 
of IBs. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
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iv.ii Three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
To eliminate the endogeneity problem from simultaneity bias (if any), first we endogenize both 
board size and independent directors based on the existing literature on board structure (e.g. Linck et al., 
2008) by developing the following regression Eqs. (2)-(4): 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … … (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … … (3) 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … … (4) 
 
The definitions of the variables used in the above models are described in Table 2. We obtained 
the 3SLS results using reg3 commands in Stata. Although there is variation in the significance levels for 
SSB, board size and board independence, the directions of the relationship is still similar to that we 
reported earlier in Tables 4-9. The coefficients for Shari’ah supervision, board structure and CEO power 
variables are the same as the results presented using two-step system GMM (Table 10) and the GLS 
random effect models (Tables 4-9). Thus, the interpretations of the results from 3SLS (Table 11) are 
consistent with the two-step system GMM and GLS-Random Effect models.  
Overall, the robustness checks in this section show that after directly controlling for endogeneity 
with the two-step system GMM and 3SLS, the influence of Shari’ah supervision, board structure and 
CEO power on the performance of IBs is similar to the main results we presented earlier in Tables 4-9. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
(v) Additional survey evidence on effectiveness of Shari’ah Board  
To complement the findings from our regression tests with respect to the effect of Shari’ah supervision 
on performance in this section we provide some evidence on the composition and nature of Shari’ah 
boards. This additional insight contributes towards better understanding the statistical associations we 
reported in the earlier sections. We conducted a survey of Shari’ah board members from our sample 
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countries. We sent out 71 questionnaires to the Shari’ah board members during April-July, 2012, but 
received a total of 11 responses from Bangladesh, Bahrain, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and the UK. The 
response rate is 15.49%9. To complement our findings in respect of H01, i.e. the relationship between 
Shari’ah supervision and performance, drawing on our questionnaire survey findings we now consider 
board effectiveness issues relating to: SSB independence; the competency of SSB members; transparency 
and disclosures in relation to SSBs and finally the legal status of the pronouncements of SSBs.  
Shari’ah Board Independence. We find from the survey that Shari’ah board members do not work for 
IBs as employees, but as advisors/consultants. A total of 55% of the respondents said that they are 
accountable to the boards of directors but 45% said they are accountable to the shareholders. However, 
91% of the respondents opine that the shareholders have the power to appoint and dismiss Shari’ah 
boards and the Shari’ah boards report to the IB’s boards of directors. All respondents opined that the 
power and responsibilities of Shari’ah boards are clearly defined in the articles of association. 
Competency & Conflicts of Interest. Despite the fact that all the respondents agree that banks review 
the qualifications and expertise of Shari’ah board members, when asked about Shari’ah board members’ 
training and their understanding of internal controls and risk management process the responses are 
mixed. Interestingly, all respondents report that their bank has never evaluated the performance of the 
Shari’ah board. When asked about Shari’ah board effectiveness, 63% say that they meet quarterly and 34% 
say that they meet monthly, and all of them report that they have not experienced quorum problems. 
Shari’ah board decisions are made based on consensus (82%) or on a 2/3rd majority basis (18%). The 
agenda of the Shari’ah board meeting is prepared and distributed between 3-7 days in advance. While 45% 
state internal Shari’ah officers handle administrative issues relating to Shari’ah board meetings, 55% report 
that the company secretary is responsible for it. Notably, all Shari’ah board members serve on a part time 
basis and serve on multiple Shari’ah boards. In some countries, the central banks restrict Shari’ah board 
members from serving on multiple boards. Interestingly, 91% of the respondents opine that non-
disclosure agreements mitigate any conflicts of interest due to multiple Shari’ah board membership.  
                                                        
9 While the response rate is not as high as we desired, and perhaps not surprising given that Shari’ah board members may not be accustomed to 
participating in questionnaire surveys and have limited time, we believe that they still shed some light on the nature of Shari’ah supervision in the 
multi-layer governance system we described earlier in the paper. 
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 Disclosure, Transparency & Consistency. First, all respondents confirm that Shari’ah boards are 
monitored either by national Shari’ah council or Shari’ah authority of the central bank. Second, 82% of 
respondents report that the bank has an independent Shari’ah board. Other IBs tend to either rely on an 
external Shari’ah advisory firm or on the internal Shari’ah officer. Third, internal Shari’ah review is 
conducted by an internal Shari’ah committee (73%). But 27% of the respondents report that it is the role 
of audit committees to conduct internal Shari’ah reviews. Fourth, 82% report that resolutions of the 
Shari’ah board are publicly available. 
Legal Status of Shari’ah Board Pronouncements. A majority of the respondents (55%) report that SSBs 
have an advisory role and merely validate documentations. In contrast 45% report that Shari’ah boards 
have a supervisory role. With respect to Shari’ah board pronouncements, 73% of the respondents are of 
the view that IBs consider them binding whereas 27% consider them merely advisory.  
As we noted earlier, Shari’ah boards are considered the key driving force for restraining IBs from 
excessive risk-taking in the multi-layer governance model of Islamic banking. We find empirical evidence 
that Shari’ah boards affect the performance of IBs (Tables 4-11). Our survey results provide additional 
insight with respect to our regression results for Shari’ah boards (H01) and emphasize the need for SSBs to 
be independent and have monitoring capability. The survey results support our empirical analysis of the 
interaction between Shari’ah and regular boards. We find that these boards are segmented (Table 7: 
Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 and Table 9: Model 3) rather than integrated. Overall, our regression results and 
survey findings lead us to conclude that while Shari’ah boards do play a critical role in affecting the 
performance of IBs, they have the potential to make more substantive contribution to the future of 
Islamic banking and help achieve ethical goals through improved independence, better monitoring and 
coordination with the regular boards of directors.    
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The main objective of our paper is to examine whether Shari’ah supervision, as a cornerstone of Islamic 
banking and representing a multi-layer corporate governance model, helps IBs perform better and create 
shareholder value. In particular, our focus is on exploring the effect of (i) Shari’ah boards, (ii) board 
structure and (iii) CEO power on the performance of IBs vis-à-vis CBs. Our focus is motivated by the 
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paucity of research examining the effect of Shari’ah supervision and corporate governance on the 
performance of IBs.  
Our analysis of bank performance and governance shows that boards of IBs are more 
independent compared with their conventional counterparts (CBs) and CBs recruit more internal CEOs 
than IBs. The small boards in IBs and Shari’ah boards seem to be profit driven, but independent directors 
are associated with a decline in IB performance. In addition, Muslim population of the country, bank 
capitalization and risk-taking behavior of IBs are a fundamental influence on their performance. We find 
different results between IBs and CBs. Therefore, we conclude that the ‘‘multi-layer’’ corporate 
governance model instituted in IBs helps them to perform better than the CBs, but this is due to inbuilt 
Shari’ah mechanisms in Islamic banking. Despite concerns about their independence and limited 
monitoring ability, we find that Shari’ah boards play a significant role in protecting shareholder interest 
and affect the performance of IBs. We also find that board structure and CEO power are also important 
influence on the performance of IBs. Our findings are robust across different measures and different 
methods.  
Our statistical regression tests show that Shari’ah boards are a significant influence on the 
performance of IBs. The regression results and the survey results together provide support for the view 
that Shari’ah boards affect the performance of IBs. Our survey evidence suggests there is scope for 
improving Shari’ah supervision, especially the independence and monitoring ability of SSBs particularly 
due to their part-time nature, holding positions on multiple boards, and being often accountable to the 
boards of directors. These constraints faced by SSBs are not unique to the IB setting but are also akin to 
those faced by audit committees generally in corporate governance (see Turley and Zaman, 2007; Zaman 
et al., 2011). SSBs tend not to have any monitoring role beyond opining on the Shari’ah compliance of IB 
products and services. However, they do perform supervisory roles in majority of IBs and also advisory 
roles in some IBs and thus provide an additional check and add value. Well-functioning, independent and 
diligent Shari’ah boards, working in concert with the regular boards of directors, are however necessary to 
ensure that the ethical goals of Islamic banking are realized in practice.  
Our findings have several implications for CBs, IBs and bank regulators. CBs can draw some 
lessons from their Islamic counter-parts and give attention to factors motivating management and boards 
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of directors. An implication of our findings for IBs is the need to ensure that Shari’ah supervision boards 
are independent and diligent and work in concert with the boards of directors. IBs also should consider 
the detrimental effect on their performance that can result from having the Chair-CEO role combined 
and having internally recruited CEOs.  
The findings of our research can be a valuable source of knowledge for policy makers and 
regulators, particularly in the financial services sector, in devising strategies to mitigate future financial 
crises. Our research contributes to the literature regarding whether a multi-layer corporate governance 
model, like that prevalent in Islamic banking, based on ethics and moral values can result in different risk-
taking behavior and in turn result in better financial performance. Future research may extend the issues 
explored in our paper and focus on examining, for instance, the role, independence and effectiveness of 
Shari’ah boards. We encourage further research on the nature, operation and effects of Shari’ah boards 
and their contribution to the governance and accountability of Islamic financial institutions. 
Acknowledgements: 
We are grateful to the Editor, Prof Carol Alexander, and two anonymous referees for valuable 
comments. We acknowledge financial support from Jan Wallenders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse, 
Handelsbanken (Project ID: P2010-0144: 1), Sweden for this research. The paper has benefitted from 
comments received on earlier versions from participants at 2012 4th IFABS Conference at Valencia, Spain, 
2012 JEBO-Islamic Finance Conference, Birmingham and 2013 World Finance Conference, Cyprus. The 
detailed and insightful comments of M Shahid Ebrahim as well as comments from Omneya Abdelsalam, 
Meryem Fethi and Mohamed Shaban are gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful to Wares Karim 
for his comments during the design stage of this paper and to Abul Hassan for his assistance with the 
questionnaire survey. Our thanks to Omar Sikder, Alovaddin Kalonov, Rokonuzzaman and other research 
assistants for their help with data collection. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors. 
 
References: 
 
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., Schmid, M., 2012. Risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance 
in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance 32, 3213-3226.  
Adams, R.B., Mehran, H., 2012. Bank board structure and performance: evidence for large bank holding 
companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 243–267. 
Abedifar, P., Molyneux, P., and Tarazi, A., 2013. Risk in Islamic banking. Review of Finance 17, 2035-
Page 25 of 39 
  
2096. 
Ahmed, H., 2009. Financial Crisis: Risks and lessons for Islamic finance. ISRA International Journal of 
Islamic Finance 1, 7-32. 
Andres, Pablo-de, Vallelado, E., 2008. Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of 
directors. Journal of Banking & Finance 32, 2570-2580. 
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variables estimation of error components 
models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51.  
Ariss, R.T., 2010. Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: A global perspective. 
Review of Financial Economics 19, 101-108. 
Baltagi, B.H., 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester. 
Baltagi, B.H., and Wu, P.X., 1999. Unequally spaced panel data regressions with AR(1) disturbances. 
Econometric Theory, 15, 814-823. 
Bauer, R., Frijns, B., Otten, R., Tourani-Rad, A., 2008. The impact of corporate governance on corporate 
performance: evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 16, 236-251. 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Merrouche, O., 2013. Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, 
efficiency, and stability. Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 433-447. 
Blundell, R., and Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. 
Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143. 
Bourkhis, K., Nabi, M.S., 2013. Islamic and conventional bank’ soundness during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Review of Financial Economics 22, 68-77. 
Brewster, D., 2008. Amana stays ahead of faith-based funds. Financial Times (December 26). 
Bryd, J., and Hickman, K., 1992. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer 
bids. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-222. 
Bushman, R.M. and Smith, A.J., 2001. Financial accounting information and corporate governance. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 237-333. 
Cerbioni, F. and Parbonetti, A., 2007. Exploring the effects of corporate governance on intellectual capital 
disclosure: an analysis of European biotechnology companies. European Accounting Review 16, 
791-826. 
Chapra, U., 2009. Global Financial Crisis: Can Islamic Finance help? A book chapter in Issues in the 
International Financial Crisis from the Islamic perspective. Islamic Economic Research Centre, 
Saudi Arabia. 
Chapra, U., 2010. Global Perspective on Islamic Finance. LSE-Harvard Public Lecture on Islamic Finance 
(February 24). 
Choudhury, M.A., and Hoque, M.Z., 2006. Corporate governance in Islamic perspective. Corporate 
Governance 6, 116-128. 
Cihak, M., and Hesse, H. 2010. Islamic banks and financial stability: An empirical analysis. Journal of 
Financial Services Research 38, 95-113. 
Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J., Tehranianu H., 2009. The Financial Crisis: Did corporate governance affect 
the performance of publicly-traded U.S. Banks Holding Companies?, www.ssrn.com. 
Desai, U., 2008. Credit crisis gives Islamic finance a chance to Shine. International Herald Tribune. 
Erkens, D., Hung, M., Matos, P., 2012. Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence 
from Financial Institutions Worldwide. Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 389-411. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C., 1983. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and 
Economics  26, 327-335. 
Francis, B., Hasan, I., Wu, Q., 2012. Do corporate boards affect firm performance? New evidence from 
the Financial Crisis. Bank of Finland Research, Discussion Papers No. 11. Available at: 
www.ssrn.com 
Gambin, L., 2004. Gender differences in the effect of health on wages in Britain. 
http://www2.eur.nl/bmg/ecuity/public_papers/ECuity3wp20GambinGenderhealthonincome.p
df  
Gani, L., and Jermias, J., 2006. Investigating the effect of board independence on performance across 
different strategies. The International Journal of Accounting 41, 295-314. 
Grais, W., and Pellegrini, M., 2006. Corporate governance and Shari’ah compliance in institutional 
offering Islamic financial services. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #WPS4054, pp. 1-
35. 
Page 26 of 39 
  
Green, S., 2010. Global perspective on Islamic finance. LSE-Harvard Public Lecture on Islamic Finance 
(February 24). 
Gupta, P.P., and Kenndy, D.B., and Weaver, S.C., 2009. Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence 
from Canadian capital markets. Corporate Ownership and Control 6, 293-307. 
Hasan, M., and Dridi, J., 2010. The effect of global crisis on Islamic and conventional banks: A 
comparative study. IMF Working Paper, WP/10/201. 
Hassan, M. K., 2011. Corporate governance practices in emerging economies: initial findings from the 
UAE. China-USA Business Review Journal 10, 856-864. 
Hermalin, B.E., and Weisbach, M.S., 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: 
A survey of the economic literature. FRBNY Economic Policy Review 9, 7-26. 
Hutchinson, M., 2002. An analysis of the association between firms' investment opportunities, board 
composition, and firm performance. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics 9, 17−39. 
Hutchinson, M., and Gul, F. A., 2004. Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practices and 
firm Performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 595-614. 
Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revaluation, exist and failure of internal control systems. The 
Journal of Finance 48, 831-880. 
Johnes, J., Izzedin, M., Pappas, V., 2013.  A comparison of performance of Islamic and conventional 
banks 2004–2009. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 103, S93-S107. 
Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., Stein, J., 2008. Rethinking Capital Regulation. Working paper, University of 
Chicago. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009. Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2008. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (#4978). 
Khan, M., Bhatti, M., Islamic banking and finance: on its way to globalization. Managerial Finance 34(10), 
708-725. 
Khanchel, I., 2007. Corporate governance: measurement and determinate analysis. Managerial Auditing 
Journal 22, 740-760. 
Kirkpatrick, G., 2009. The Corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis, Financial Market 
Trends, OECD 2009/1, 1-30. 
Krause, R., Samadeni, M., Candella, A., 2014. CEO duality: a review and research agenda. Journal of 
Management 40(1), 256-286. 
Larcker, D.F., Richardson, A.A. and Tuna, I., 2007. Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and 
organizational performance. The Accounting Review 82, 963-1008. 
Lee, C., Rosenstein, S., Rangan, N., & Davidson III,W. N., 1992. Board composition and shareholder 
wealth: The case of management buyouts. Financial Management 21, 58−72. 
Lewis, M.K., 2005. Islamic corporate governance. Review of Islamic Economics 9, 5-29. 
Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M., Yang, T., 2008. A large sample study on board changes and determinants of 
board structure. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 308-328. 
Olson, D., and Zoubi, T. A., 2008. Using accounting ratios to distinguish between Islamic and 
conventional banks in the GCC region. The International Journal of Accounting 43, 45-65. 
Parrino, R., Sias, R., Starks, L., 2003. Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around 
forced CEO turnover.  Journal of Financial Economics 68, 3–46. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance 33, 
1340-1350. 
Pathan, S., and Faff, R., 2013. Does board structure in banks really affect their performance? Journal of 
Banking & Finance 37, 1573-1589. 
Pathan, S., and Skully, M., 2010. Endogenously structured boards of directors in Banks. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 34, 1590-1606. 
Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt, J.G., 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth.  
Journal of Financial Economics 26, 175-191. 
Roodman, D., 2009. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to "difference" and "system" GMM in Stata. 
Stata Journal 9, 86-136. 
Safieddin, A., 2009. Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: New insights for agency 
theory. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17, 142-158. 
Sharfman, B. S., 2009. Enhancing the efficiency of board decision making: Lessons learned from the 
financial crisis of 2008. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34, 813-851. 
Page 27 of 39 
  
Sierra, G.E., Talmor, E., Wallace, J.S., 2006. An examination of multiple governance forces within bank 
holding companies. Journal of Financial Services Research 29, 105–123. 
Stanwick, P.A., and Stanwick, S. D., 2010. The relationship between governance and financial 
performance: an empirical study of Canadian firms. The Business Review 16, 35-41. 
Turley, S., and Zaman, M. 2007. Audit committee effectiveness: a case study of informal processes and 
behavioral effects. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 20, 765-788.  
Usmani, T. 1998. An Introduction to Islamic Finance. Idratul Ma’arif.  
Volpin, P., 2002. Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover in 
Italy.  Journal of Financial Economics 64, 61–91. 
Weir, C., Laing, D., McKnight, P.J., 2002. Internal and external governance mechanisms: their impact on 
the performance of the UK large public companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 
29, 579-611. 
Weisbach, M., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover.  Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460. 
Wilson, R., 2010. Why is Islamic banking successful? Islamic banks are unscathed despite financial crisis. 
www.islamonline.net 
Wintoki, M.B., Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M., 2012. Endogeneity and the dynamics of corporate governance, 
Journal of Financial Economics 105, 581–606. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London. 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 40, 185–212. 
Zaher, T. S. and Hassan, M. K., 2001. A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and banking. 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 10 (No 4), 155-199. 
Zaman, M., Hudaib, M., Haniffa, R., 2011. Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit fees. 
Journal of Banking Finance & Accounting, 38, 165-197. 
 
  
Page 28 of 39 
  
Figure 1: Governance Framework in Islamic Banking (Proposed by Authors) 
  
Shari'ah  
Board 
• SUPRA AUTHORITY: 
• Prohibits the Board of Directors in creating credit against credit due to the prohibitation of interest under Islamic Shari'ah Law 
• Prohibits the Board of Directors in creating unethical products like the CDOs and CDS due to the involvement of doubtful investment (i.e., the Arabic 
word Gharar) 
Boards of 
Directors 
• RELIGIOUS BELIEF, ETHICS AND MORALITY  DRIVEN BOARD: 
• Refrain from generating poor quality lending 
• Refrain from Aggressive Risk Taking 
• Eventually protect banks against fallibility and thus, perform better and help create more value than conventional counterparts (CBs) 
• Overall, the board ensures social justice 
• PERFORMANCE 
• Performance, Risk Taking and Accountability of Islamic Banks 
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Table 1: Sample Distribution 
The table describes the sample of the study. The study considers 172 banks (86 Islamic and 86 conventional) over 25 
countries for the period of 2005-2011. The country-wise distribution of the banks, observations, and percentage are 
given in columns 2-6. 
Country 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conventional 
Banks 
Full Sample (all 
Banks) 
Observations Percentage 
Bahamas 1 1 2 14 1% 
Bahrain 8 8 16 112 9% 
Bangladesh 5 5 10 70 6% 
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 2 14 1% 
Egypt 2 2 4 28 2% 
Gambia 1 1 2 14 1% 
Indonesia 1 1 2 14 1% 
Iraq 1 1 2 14 1% 
Jordan 3 3 6 42 3% 
Kuwait 5 5 10 70 6% 
Lebanon 1 1 2 14 1% 
Malaysia 11 11 22 154 13% 
Mauritania 1 1 2 14 1% 
Pakistan 11 11 22 154 13% 
Palestinian Territory 1 1 2 14 1% 
Qatar 2 2 4 28 2% 
Saudi Arabia 6 6 12 84 7% 
Senegal 1 1 2 14 1% 
Sudan 7 7 14 98 8% 
Thailand 1 1 2 14 1% 
Tunisia 1 1 2 14 1% 
Turkey 4 4 8 56 5% 
United Arab Emirates 7 7 14 98 8% 
United Kingdom 3 3 6 42 3% 
Yemen 1 1 2 14 1% 
Total 
 
86 86 172 1204 100% 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
Variables Definitions and Coding 
Panel A: Dependent variables (bank performance) 
ROIAE= Operational efficiency. Operating profit divided by average equity. 
ROIAA= Operational efficiency. Operating profit divided by total assets.  
ROAE= Operational efficiency. Net income divided by average total equity.  
ROAA= Return on average assets. Net income divided by average total assets.  
Tobins’Q= Market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by book 
value of assets. 
 
Panel B: Shari’ah Supervision and Corporate Governance variablesa 
SSB= Shari’ah board size. 
lnBoard= Log of number of members on the board of directors. 
Board_indep= Proportion of independent non-execs on the board. 
CEO_chair= Duality, coded 1 if the chair and CEO are the same person. 
CEO_internal= CEO recruited internally, coded 1 if yes, otherwise 0. 
 
Panel C: Company specific variables 
Big4_adtr= Auditor is a Big4 firm, coded 1 if yes, otherwise 0. 
Risk_disclosure= Index of disclosure, 0.2 given for disclosure of each of the following 
risks: credit, liquidity, market, operational, and fund. 
1/z= 1/z is the risk-taking variable. Z-scope measures the distance to default, 
which is estimated as ROA plus capital to asset ratio divided by 
standard deviation of ROA. We estimate 1/Z as 1/log Z-score. 
EQTA= Equity to total assets a measure of level of protection afforded to the 
bank by the equity. 
NLTA= Net loans to total assets an indicator of the proportion of assets that are 
tied up in loans. 
Log_TA= Log of the total asset of the bank, a proxy for size. 
 
Panel  D: Country specific variables 
lnGDP_percapita= Log of GDP per capita. 
Muslim_population= Percent of Muslim population. 
Inflation=  Inflation rate 
 
Panel  E: Islamic Bank Dummy 
Islamic= Dummy for Islamic Bank in the full sample 
aNote: lnBoard and Board_indep constitute board structure. CEO_chair and CEO_internal constitute CEO power.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents for the full sample the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
Full Sample 
IBs 
Sample 
Mean 
CBs 
Sample 
Mean 
 
Two-sample 
T-Test 
 VARIABLES 
N mean sd min max   skew   kurt p1 p99 
ROIAE 1204 0.1022 0.2314 -2.5625 1.0251 -2.8824 26.278 -0.8639 0.5922 0.1044 0.0999 0.3398 
ROAE 1204 0.0875 0.1999 -2.5903 1.0924 -3.3558 37.6208 -0.7293 0.5085 0.0863 0.0888 -0.2111 
ROIAA 1204 0.0141 0.0374 -0.2753 0.6605 3.7997 87.2752 -0.0912 0.095 0.0129 0.0152 -1.0688 
ROAA 1204 0.0132 0.0373 -0.2753 0.6557 4.5623 91.5399 -0.0843 0.1034 0.0124 0.014 -0.7431 
TobinsQ 668 0.9411 0.2661 0 2.4669 2.5701 7.8655 0.1779 1.7021 0.9256 0.9589 -1.6157 
SSB 525 4.1714 1.8884 1 14 1.7606 9.9327 1 12 4.1714 - - 
Board_size 1070 9.0804 2.6245 3 24 0.9112 5.1757 4 18 9.0737 9.088 -0.089 
Board_indep 877 0.2671 0.279 0 1 0.5368 1.9343 0 0.84 0.3678 0.1519 12.38*** 
CEO_chair 957 0.1097 0.3127 0 1 2.4975 7.2375 0 1 0.099 0.1217 -1.119 
CEO_internal 882 0.28 0.4493 0 1 0.9797 1.9598 0 1 0.1937 0.3989 -6.868*** 
Big4_adtr 991 0.7861 0.4103 0 1 -1.3952 2.9467 0 1 0.7829 0.7895 -0.2501 
Risk_disclosure 1091 0.679 0.3149 0 1 -1.1357 3.1911 0 1 0.709 0.6504 3.0827*** 
Log Z 1034 2.7751 0.9805 -5.0588 6.2165 -0.7965 7.7155 0.0417 5.0855 2.8006 2.7504 0.8224 
EQTA 1204 0.1612 0.1723 -0.5893 1 2.1956 10.4442 0 0.916 0.1768 0.1457 3.1409*** 
NLTA 1046 0.4768 0.2196 0 0.9546 -0.5509 2.506 0.0012 0.8763 0.4797 0.4739 0.4286 
Log_TA 1054 21.1903 1.7205 13.1803 25.1093 -0.2335 2.9145 17.2038 24.6133 21.0725 21.3067 -1.2137 
Islamic 1204 0.5000 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 - - 
lnGDP_percapita 1190 8.6888 1.5428 6.0429 11.3948 -0.1297 1.6143 6.0475 11.1776 - - - 
Muslim_population  1204 79.2093 22.9112 0 100 -1.9448 6.9605 0 100 - - - 
Inflation 1138 6.5228 5.4706 -10.0675 53.2310 1.9879 13.5844 -1.0508 22.1112 - - - 
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Table 4: Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), and Corporate Governance and Firm Performance – All Period (2005-2011) 
 
This table presents the results for the governance and performance for sub-samples (Panel A, B, and C) for all period. Performance proxies ROIAE, ROAE, ROIAA, AND ROAA are used by employed in equation 1. See Table 2 for 
description of variables. lnBoard*Board_indep and CEO_chair*CEO_internal are interaction variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Panel A: Islamic Banks (IBs) Panel B: Conventional Banks (CBs) Panel C: Full Sample (IBs and CBs together) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA 
SSB 0.016** 0.008 0.001 0.001         
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)         
lnBoard -0.016** -0.020*** -0.004** -0.005*** 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board_indep -0.479** -0.465*** -0.089** -0.103*** 0.145 0.120 0.017 0.015 -0.054 -0.071 -0.014 -0.019 
 (0.190) (0.152) (0.040) (0.038) (0.112) (0.097) (0.020) (0.018) (0.065) (0.055) (0.014) (0.014) 
CEO_chair -0.054 -0.051 -0.011 -0.010 -0.024 -0.029 -0.009 -0.010 -0.049 -0.052 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.077) (0.054) (0.013) (0.010) (0.072) (0.070) (0.022) (0.022) (0.055) (0.040) (0.011) (0.009) 
CEO_internal -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.017 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnBoard*Board_indep 0.049** 0.047*** 0.009** 0.010*** -0.016 -0.013 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_chair*CEO_internal 0.078 0.084 0.014 0.013 0.054 0.061 0.013 0.016 0.073 0.081* 0.015 0.015 
 (0.085) (0.061) (0.015) (0.012) (0.081) (0.077) (0.023) (0.022) (0.061) (0.044) (0.012) (0.010) 
Big4_adtr -0.029 -0.025 -0.006 -0.006 0.017 0.020 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.018) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) 
Risk_disclosure 0.014 0.017 0.003 0.004 -0.063 -0.046 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.005) (0.005) (0.043) (0.036) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004) 
1/z 0.116*** 0.098*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.113*** 0.099*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log_TA -0.011 -0.012** -0.003** -0.003** 0.007 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
EQTA -0.238*** -0.188*** -0.043 -0.033 -0.280*** -0.229*** 0.020 0.028 -0.244*** -0.199*** -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.035) (0.029) (0.097) (0.080) (0.032) (0.030) (0.043) (0.037) (0.020) (0.017) 
NLTA 0.018 -0.029 0.001 -0.009 -0.035 -0.031 -0.016 -0.015 0.003 -0.027 -0.007 -0.014 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.014) (0.014) (0.112) (0.088) (0.017) (0.014) (0.049) (0.042) (0.009) (0.009) 
Muslim_population 0.002** 0.002** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnGDP_percapita 0.015 0.023** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.004** 0.010 0.017** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic         -0.022 -0.021 -0.004 -0.002 
         (0.027) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.093 -0.054 0.014 0.005 -0.329 -0.297** -0.040 -0.049* -0.333** -0.326*** -0.029 -0.039* 
 (0.232) (0.204) (0.039) (0.038) (0.257) (0.151) (0.029) (0.027) (0.162) (0.120) (0.021) (0.021) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Random Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pooled Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 1204 1204 1204 1204 
Overall R2 0.367 0.314 0.249 0.250 0.208 0.228 0.120 0.136 0.218 0.225 0.127 0.131 
Wald Chi2 74.32*** 60.97*** 37.77*** 36.96*** 69.35*** 69.75*** 29.31*** 27.17*** 104.84*** 95.64*** 61.38*** 58.51*** 
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Table 5: Shari’ah Supervisory Board, CG and Performance: Pre, crisis, and post crisis 
This table presents the results for the governance and performance for sub-samples (Panel A, B, and C) for crisis period.  The results for company specific and 
country specific variables are not reported due to space. See Table 2 for description of variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * are the 
levels of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Islamic Banks (IBs) 
 ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA 
VARIABLES Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-
Crisis 
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-
Crisis 
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-
Crisis 
SSB 
0.008 0.023*** 0.013** -0.008 0.011* 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
lnBoard 
-0.001 -0.009 -0.006 0.032*** -0.010 -0.016 -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Board_indep 
-0.297 -0.384 -0.361 0.132 -0.231 -0.462* -0.053 -0.079 -0.075 -0.045 -0.053 -0.084* 
 (0.405) (0.340) (0.299) (0.189) (0.200) (0.264) (0.071) (0.071) (0.053) (0.052) (0.045) (0.049) 
CEO_chair 
0.055 0.021 -0.348*** -0.050 0.027 -0.247*** -0.002 0.005 -0.044*** 0.002 0.005 -0.029** 
 (0.098) (0.056) (0.050) (0.053) (0.040) (0.045) (0.024) (0.007) (0.014) (0.019) (0.005) (0.013) 
CEO_internal 
-0.106 -0.023 0.073 -0.006 -0.020 0.047 -0.005 0.000 0.014 -0.006 0.001 0.009 
 (0.088) (0.025) (0.058) (0.047) (0.022) (0.045) (0.021) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.011) 
Constant -0.188 0.128 0.041 -0.606** 0.019 -0.048 -0.047 0.091 -0.088 -0.057 0.046 -0.091 
 (0.386) (0.344) (0.320) (0.294) (0.264) (0.292) (0.103) (0.066) (0.079) (0.085) (0.050) (0.076) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Overall R2 0.400 0.449 0.332 0.303 0.426 0.307 0.222 0.349 0.211 0.243 0.379 0.275 
Wald Chi2 83.28*** 78.38*** 21.40*** 75.01*** 80.87*** 26.09*** 41.17*** 64.76*** 27.10*** 39.03*** 79.85*** 21.09*** 
 
Panel B: Conventional Banks (CBs) 
lnBoard 
0.003 0.011* 0.016* 0.003 0.013* 0.012* 0.000 0.002 0.002* 0.000 0.002 0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Board_indep 
0.026 0.184 0.552** -0.017 0.210 0.405** 0.005 0.037 0.068*** 0.004 0.039 0.053*** 
 (0.181) (0.145) (0.223) (0.173) (0.159) (0.160) (0.048) (0.029) (0.024) (0.046) (0.032) (0.019) 
CEO_chair 
-0.049 -0.177*** 0.024 -0.047 -0.171*** 0.041 0.005 -0.034*** 0.000 0.000 -0.036*** 0.003 
 (0.098) (0.062) (0.072) (0.075) (0.051) (0.051) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.006) 
CEO_internal 
-0.000 -0.020 0.027 -0.016 -0.023 0.009 -0.007 -0.007* 0.005 -0.007 -0.008* 0.004 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.051) (0.024) (0.024) (0.039) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.615** -0.720* 0.599* -0.547*** -0.845** 0.223 -0.098* -0.122** 0.021 -0.093* -0.129** -0.012 
 (0.304) (0.404) (0.334) (0.211) (0.330) (0.240) (0.051) (0.057) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) (0.029) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Overall R2 0.293 0.329 0.282 0.332 0.392 0.246 0.156 0.378 0.296 0.169 0.433 0.360 
Wald Chi2 65.11*** 62.87*** 53.97*** 55.92*** 34.50*** 52.38*** 44.75*** 42.01*** 42.61*** 34.65*** 24.44*** 27.22*** 
 
Panel C: Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
lnBoard 
0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Baord_indep 
0.011 0.030 0.003 -0.035 0.056 -0.014 -0.028 0.023 0.001 -0.026 0.022 0.004 
 (0.103) (0.118) (0.140) (0.082) (0.095) (0.116) (0.021) (0.017) (0.026) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) 
CEO_chair -0.049 -0.002 -0.380*** -0.078** 0.008 -0.260*** 0.010 -0.004 -0.045*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.033*** 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) 
CEO_Internal -0.018 -0.035** 0.034 -0.028 -0.027* 0.016 -0.010* -0.005* 0.002 -0.010* -0.005* 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Islamic 
-0.028 -0.008 -0.036 -0.031 -0.010 -0.025 -0.008 0.002 -0.007* -0.006 0.001 -0.006* 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -0.531*** -0.377 0.403* -0.552*** -0.527** 0.116 -0.057 -0.065* -0.001 -0.071* -0.090*** -0.020 
 (0.192) (0.248) (0.207) (0.168) (0.213) (0.162) (0.036) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.027) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 
Overall R2 0.235 0.281 0.580 0.254 0.299 0.539 0.156 0.241 0.448 0.185 0.250 0.386 
Wald Chi2 77.53*** 53.67*** 95.38*** 79.85*** 58.59*** 57.55*** 50.59*** 40.18*** 133.11*** 56.31*** 49.15*** 36.42*** 
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Table 6: Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 
This table presents the results for the governance and performance for sub-samples (Panel A, B, and C) and for all period and crisis period. Performance proxy Tobin’s Q is used by employed in equation 1. See Table 2 for description of 
variables. lnBoard*Board_indep and CEO_chair*CEO_internal are interaction variables. We define full period as 2005-2011, pre-crisis as 2005-2007, during crisis as 2008-2009, and post-crisis as 2010-2011. Robust standard errors are in 
the parenthesis. ***, **, and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Panel A: Islamic Banks (IBs) Panel B: conventional Banks (CBs) Panel C: Full Sample (IBs and CBs together) 
VARIABLES Full Period Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Full Period Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Full Period Pre-crisis Crisis Crisis 
SSB 0.015 0.026 0.018* 0.019         
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014)         
lnBoard -0.013 0.038 0.026 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.000 0.002 -0.033*** 
 (0.025) (0.074) (0.025) (0.026) (0.006) (0.009) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) 
Board_indep -0.024 1.689 0.454 0.256 0.020 0.862** -0.669 -0.010 0.003 0.863*** -0.011 -0.424 
 (0.388) (1.241) (0.407) (0.795) (0.298) (0.419) (0.887) (0.396) (0.152) (0.309) (0.102) (0.277) 
CEO_chair -0.115 0.407 0.007 -0.269* 0.758 -0.083 1.523*** -0.151 0.303 -0.231*** 0.153 -0.384** 
 (0.076) (0.339) (0.037) (0.151) (0.551) (0.087) (0.071) (0.101) (0.354) (0.080) (0.164) (0.180) 
CEO_internal -0.167** -0.414 0.001 -0.397** 0.042 -0.041 0.073 0.092 -0.008 -0.122* -0.006 0.087 
 (0.073) (0.326) (0.038) (0.142) (0.041) (0.067) (0.082) (0.105) (0.031) (0.072) (0.017) (0.074) 
lnBoard*Board_indep 0.004 -0.163 -0.037 -0.047 0.009 -0.083* 0.056 -0.005 0.006 -0.085*** -0.001 0.048 
 (0.040) (0.135) (0.039) (0.078) (0.035) (0.045) (0.086) (0.038) (0.017) (0.032) (0.008) (0.034) 
CEO_chair*CEO_internal 0.327*** 0.000 -0.190 0.648*** -0.801 0.118 -1.602*** 0.000 -0.272 0.359*** -0.338 0.326 
 (0.120) (0.000) (0.143) (0.215) (0.554) (0.116) (0.080) (0.000) (0.354) (0.110) (0.208) (0.210) 
Big4_adtr 0.004 0.125 -0.031 0.250* 0.018 0.131* 0.094 -0.081 0.011 0.075 -0.005 -0.173* 
 (0.066) (0.162) (0.038) (0.132) (0.042) (0.072) (0.093) (0.070) (0.035) (0.064) (0.023) (0.097) 
Risk_disclosure -0.025 0.116 -0.080 -0.123 0.054 0.026 0.141 0.140 -0.015 0.092 -0.081*** 0.140 
 (0.072) (0.326) (0.050) (0.131) (0.077) (0.101) (0.119) (0.135) (0.048) (0.111) (0.031) (0.097) 
1/z -0.027 0.069 -0.055 -0.052 0.025 -0.010 0.040 -0.005 0.011 0.004 0.002 -0.033 
 (0.028) (0.089) (0.038) (0.044) (0.016) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.015) (0.030) (0.032) (0.079) 
Log_TA -0.039** -0.025 -0.019 -0.039** 0.006 0.009 -0.033 0.002 -0.013 -0.002 0.005 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.043) (0.020) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.037) (0.023) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.025) 
EQTA -0.311* -0.475 -0.372*** -0.413** -0.911*** -1.123*** -0.928*** -0.817*** -0.655*** -0.927*** -0.460*** -0.526 
 (0.162) (0.300) (0.134) (0.170) (0.083) (0.169) (0.279) (0.207) (0.105) (0.143) (0.140) (0.625) 
NLTA -0.025 -0.129 -0.257 0.475 0.099 0.004 -0.080 -0.002 -0.006 -0.092 -0.209 0.044 
 (0.163) (0.305) (0.164) (0.283) (0.102) (0.198) (0.307) (0.183) (0.087) (0.162) (0.149) (0.430) 
Muslim_population 0.003** 0.007*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.001* 0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
lnGDP_percapita 0.055*** 0.152*** 0.035 0.055 0.016 0.052** 0.002 0.005 0.049*** 0.102*** 0.046*** -0.246*** 
 (0.018) (0.036) (0.021) (0.049) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.060) 
Inflation -0.004 -0.010 -0.004** 0.018 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.080*** 
 (0.004) (0.022) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.019) 
Islamic         0.026 0.144** -0.091 0.200* 
         (0.036) (0.067) (0.077) (0.116) 
Constant 1.302*** -0.900 0.840 1.165 0.614** 0.197 1.528 1.094** 0.715*** -0.231 0.504 3.759*** 
 (0.472) (1.364) (0.600) (0.864) (0.299) (0.558) (1.127) (0.404) (0.249) (0.454) (0.375) (0.770) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pooled Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 1204 1204 1204 1204 
Overall R2 0.352 0.388 0.489 0.317 0.557 0.473 0.293 0.247 0.331 0.527 0.355 0.055 
Wald Chi2 41.29*** 43.21*** 54.16*** 27.25*** 78.50*** 36.63*** 43.20*** 23.00*** 21.23*** 31.21*** 65.26*** 33.34*** 
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Table 7: Supervisory Role and Advisory Role of SSB and Firm Performance in IBs 
This table presents the results for the governance and performance based on whether the Shari’ah boards perform a supervisory or an advisory role. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA 
VARIABLES (1) 
Supervisory 
Board 
(2) 
Advisory 
Board 
(3) 
Interaction 
Between 
boards 
(4) 
Supervisory 
Board 
(5) 
Advisory 
Board 
(6) 
Interaction 
Between 
boards 
(7) 
Supervisory 
Board 
(8) 
Advisory 
Board 
(9) 
Interaction 
Between 
boards 
(10) 
Supervisory 
Board 
(11) 
Advisory 
Board 
(12) 
Interaction 
Between boards 
SSB 0.020*** -0.036* 0.019*** 0.013** -0.040** 0.007 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
lnBoard -0.019** -0.005 -0.016** -0.022*** -0.004 -0.019*** -0.004** -0.004 -0.004** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.005*** 
 (0.008) (0.036) (0.008) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Board_indep -0.518** -0.218 -0.482** -0.482*** -0.110 -0.455*** -0.088** -0.161 -0.088** -0.106*** -0.102 -0.102*** 
 (0.201) (0.741) (0.192) (0.158) (0.575) (0.151) (0.043) (0.207) (0.041) (0.040) (0.169) (0.038) 
CEO_chair -0.051 0.000 -0.059 -0.047 0.059 -0.055 -0.010 0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.000 -0.010 
 (0.080) (0.000) (0.077) (0.055) (0.123) (0.053) (0.013) (0.044) (0.013) (0.010) (0.036) (0.010) 
CEO_internal -0.020 -0.011 -0.009 -0.026 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.070) (0.021) (0.021) (0.055) (0.020) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) 
Big4_adtr -0.002 -0.113* -0.028 0.001 -0.087* -0.023 -0.001 -0.020 -0.006 -0.001 -0.018 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.062) (0.023) (0.015) (0.048) (0.020) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005) 
Risk_disclosure -0.026 0.138** 0.019 -0.024 0.145*** 0.019 -0.004 0.020 0.003 -0.003 0.021 0.004 
 (0.026) (0.064) (0.025) (0.021) (0.050) (0.021) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) 
1/z 0.108*** 0.053 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.007 0.098*** 0.011*** 0.019* 0.014*** 0.012** 0.011 0.012*** 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.019) (0.023) (0.032) (0.020) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Log_TA -0.005 -0.077*** -0.011 -0.006 -0.078*** -0.012** -0.002 -0.010 -0.003** -0.002 -0.010* -0.003** 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
EQTA -0.211*** -0.080 -0.240*** -0.151** -0.028 -0.191*** -0.017 -0.036 -0.043 -0.025 -0.010 -0.034 
 (0.069) (0.142) (0.057) (0.070) (0.110) (0.053) (0.025) (0.040) (0.035) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) 
NLTA -0.008 0.034 0.019 -0.066 -0.015 -0.029 -0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.065) (0.105) (0.060) (0.060) (0.082) (0.058) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) 
SSB*Strong_board   -0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
SSB*CEO_power   -0.019   -0.015   0.000   0.000 
   (0.015)   (0.012)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Muslim_population 0.002*** 0.002 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnGDP_percapita 0.018 0.107*** 0.014 0.030*** 0.094*** 0.023** 0.004** 0.025** 0.004** 0.006** 0.021** 0.005*** 
 (0.012) (0.036) (0.012) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Inflation 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003** -0.005 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.266 0.796 -0.110 -0.313 1.031** -0.062 -0.012 0.019 0.014 -0.027 0.061 0.006 
 (0.218) (0.611) (0.234) (0.192) (0.475) (0.206) (0.038) (0.171) (0.039) (0.043) (0.139) (0.039) 
Observations 427 98 602 427 98 602 427 98 602 427 98 602 
Overall R2 0.414 0.656 0.368 0.377 0.717 0.314 0.325 0.455 0.249 0.311 0.470 0.249 
Wald Chi2 84.33*** 17.91*** 79.46*** 82.65*** 14.10*** 61.37*** 53.52*** 15.85*** 37.57*** 47.61*** 19.45*** 36.59*** 
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Table 8: Firm Performance differs in IBs due to Bank size and country size variations  
 
This table presents the results for the governance and performance based on bank size and country size. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Robust 
standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Large IBs  Panel B: Small IBs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA 
SSB 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.005** 0.004** 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnBoard 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Baord_indep -0.096** -0.092** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.003 -0.020 0.006 0.002 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.011) (0.010) (0.032) (0.027) (0.006) (0.006) 
CEO_chair 0.073 0.057 0.015 0.012 -0.028 -0.034 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.048) (0.043) (0.009) (0.009) (0.067) (0.047) (0.011) (0.010) 
CEO_inernal -0.024 -0.017 -0.004 -0.001 -0.034 -0.015 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.005) (0.005) (0.040) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log_TA -0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.013 -0.023 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.357 0.110 -0.050 -0.084 0.349 0.445 0.194 0.143 
 (0.504) (0.412) (0.099) (0.089) (0.741) (0.698) (0.131) (0.128) 
Observations 124 124 124 124 142 138 142 142 
Number of bank 40 40 40 40 47 46 47 47 
Overall R2 0.246 0.208 0.151 0.144 0.261 0.256 0.123 0.145 
Wald Chi2 15.16* 20.09** 21.22** 17.64** 16.43* 11.41 20.77** 19.13** 
  
Panel C: Big Countries 
 
Panel D: Small Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA 
SSB 0.010 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.005 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
lnBoard -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Board_indep -0.330 -0.132 -0.043 -0.041 -0.554*** -0.693*** -0.122** -0.158*** 
 (0.306) (0.192) (0.044) (0.039) (0.209) (0.182) (0.056) (0.052) 
CEO_chair -0.126 -0.084 -0.019 -0.014 0.037 -0.028 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.106) (0.084) (0.019) (0.014) (0.082) (0.068) (0.015) (0.014) 
CEO_internal 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.035 -0.067*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004) (0.029) (0.025) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log_TA -0.017** -0.013** -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.171 -0.199 -0.022 -0.027 0.159 0.222 0.078 0.062 
 (0.290) (0.231) (0.056) (0.050) (0.386) (0.361) (0.078) (0.085) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 117 117 117 117 
Overall R2 0.453 0.497 0.387 0.437 0.338 0.254 0.187 0.186 
Wald Chi2 63.94*** 70.89*** 39.83*** 52.42*** 57.03*** 64.08*** 31.83*** 42.41*** 
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Table 9: Supervisory and Advisory board (SSB), bank size, country size variation – Tobin’s Q 
 
This table presents the results for the governance and market based performance based whether Shari’ah boards perform a supervisory or advisory 
role, and based on bank size and country size. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * are 
the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 Panel A:  
SSB Supervisory vs. Advisory 
Panel B:  
Bank Size Difference 
Panel C:  
Country Size Difference 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Supervisory 
Board 
(2) 
Advisory 
Board 
(3) 
Interaction 
Between 
board 
(4) 
Large 
Bank 
(5) 
Small 
Bank 
(6) 
Large 
Country 
(7) 
Small 
Country 
SSB 0.031** -0.001 0.029* 0.031 0.022 0.021 0.031* 
 (0.016) (0.063) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.028) (0.017) 
lnBoard -0.028 -0.013 -0.017 -0.009 -0.039 -0.040 -0.011 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.024) (0.028) (0.051) (0.044) (0.031) 
Baord_indep -0.223 0.452 -0.149 0.060 -0.372 -0.453 -0.223 
 (0.432) (1.083) (0.372) (0.463) (0.771) (0.622) (0.536) 
CEO_chair -0.110 -0.025 -0.102 -0.016 -0.224** -0.354*** -0.054 
 (0.089) (0.238) (0.089) (0.091) (0.105) (0.117) (0.065) 
CEO_internal -0.224*** -0.036 -0.178** 0.095 -0.151* -0.070 -0.295** 
 (0.083) (0.104) (0.073) (0.104) (0.083) (0.079) (0.122) 
Big4 0.065 -0.433** 0.005 -0.058 0.022 -0.055 0.045 
 (0.062) (0.182) (0.066) (0.093) (0.084) (0.117) (0.076) 
Risk_dissclosure -0.074 0.078 -0.023 0.021 -0.120 -0.029 0.005 
 (0.076) (0.157) (0.071) (0.091) (0.099) (0.112) (0.103) 
1/z -0.033 0.140 -0.028 0.017 -0.028 -0.049 -0.056 
 (0.032) (0.271) (0.028) (0.033) (0.055) (0.039) (0.058) 
Log_TA -0.040** 0.001 -0.039** -0.124** -0.010 -0.062* -0.034 
 (0.019) (0.157) (0.016) (0.054) (0.033) (0.033) (0.021) 
EQTA -0.476*** -0.485 -0.338** 0.047 -0.827*** -0.307* -0.153 
 (0.183) (0.447) (0.154) (0.235) (0.167) (0.176) (0.245) 
NLTA 0.041 0.261 -0.025 0.078 -0.252 0.124 -0.217 
 (0.207) (0.191) (0.161) (0.172) (0.236) (0.168) (0.234) 
SSB*Strong_board   -0.004*     
   (0.002)     
SSB*CEO_power   0.026     
   (0.052)     
Muslim_population 0.002 0.895 0.003** 0.006** 0.004* 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (1.827) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
lnGDP_percapita 0.074*** -0.239 0.055*** 0.072** 0.076*** 0.006 0.055** 
 (0.023) (0.626) (0.018) (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.026) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.011* 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 1.333** -83.319 1.294*** 2.594** 0.968 2.615** 1.844** 
 (0.541) (175.140) (0.437) (1.079) (0.734) (1.020) (0.787) 
Observations 427 98 602 73 73 72 74 
Overall R2 0.396 0.870 0.368 0.432 0.496 0.533 0.374 
Wald chi2 44.24*** 18.09*** 44.56*** 21.09 100.25*** 132.47*** 30.43** 
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Table 10: GMM Model- SSB, CG and Firm Performance 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ROIAE ROAE ROIAA ROAA TOBINSQ 
      
Performancet-1 0.389*** 0.340*** 0.484*** 0.505*** 0.160** 
 (0.093) (0.075) (0.118) (0.099) (0.112) 
SSB 0.014** 0.005* 0.001* -0.001 0.039** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) 
lnBoard -0.012** -0.012* -0.001* -0.001* -0.038** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) 
Board_indep -0.027** -0.023** -0.004* -0.001* -0.008** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.013) (0.006) (0.131) 
CEO_chair -0.018** -0.017** -0.003* -0.006** -0.268* 
 (0.073) (0.046) (0.013) (0.010) (0.164) 
CEO_internal -0.010* -0.012* -0.004* 0.008 0.123* 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.008) (0.007) (0.133) 
Bg4 -0.022 -0.019 0.001 0.001 0.223* 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.009) (0.005) (0.126) 
Risk_disclosure -0.030 -0.037 -0.008 -0.006 -0.370* 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.016) (0.009) (0.216) 
EQTA -0.033 0.063 -0.010 -0.018 0.305 
 (0.158) (0.131) (0.026) (0.021) (0.622) 
NLTA 0.073 0.148 0.011 0.009 0.443*** 
 (0.136) (0.109) (0.021) (0.013) (0.093) 
1/z 0.055 0.039 0.004 0.003 0.036 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.004) (0.003) (0.098) 
Log_TA -0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.022 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) 
Muslim_population 0.001** 0.001** 0.000** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) 
lnGDP_percapita -0.009 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.053 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.074) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) 
Constant 0.052 -0.133 0.014 -0.007 1.231 
 (0.321) (0.385) (0.053) (0.039) (1.260) 
Pooled Observations 602 602 602 602 602 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 36.49*** 29.47*** 31.36*** 28.71*** 23.56*** 
AR(1) test statistics (P-value) -2.32 
(0.02) 
-2.43 
(0.02) 
-2.17 
(0.03) 
-2.15 
(0.03) 
-2.05 
(0.04) 
AR(2) test statistics (P-value) 1.49 
(0.14) 
1.27 
(0.22) 
1.54 
(0.12) 
1.03 
(0.30) 
-0.56 
(0.58) 
Hansen J-statistics (P-value) 18.47 
(0.95) 
18.88 
(0.89) 
13.26 
(0.99) 
12.51 
(0.99) 
11.14 
(0.99) 
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Table 11: 3SLS Model- SSB, CG and Bank Performance 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * are the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES ROIAE lnBoard Board_indep ROAE lnBoard Board_indep ROIAA lnBoard Board_indep ROAA lnBoard Board_indep TOBINSQ lnBoard Board_indep 
                
SSB 0.019*** 0.079 0.002 0.008* 0.079 0.002 0.002* 0.079 0.002 0.001* 0.079 0.002 0.037** 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.008) (0.005) (0.041) (0.008) (0.001) (0.041) (0.008) (0.001) (0.041) (0.008) (0.036) (0.052) (0.012) 
lnBoard -0.011**  -0.046*** -0.010**  -0.046*** -0.003**  -0.046*** -0.002*  -0.046*** -0.036**  -0.047** 
 (0.009)  (0.015) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.002)  (0.015) (0.002)  (0.015) (0.041)  (0.022) 
Board_indep -0.032*** -
1.118*** 
 -0.024*** -
1.118*** 
 -0.026* -
1.118*** 
 -0.014** -
1.118*** 
 -0.731*** -1.157**  
 (0.117) (0.359)  (0.109) (0.359)  (0.030) (0.359)  (0.027) (0.359)  (0.053) (0.519)  
CEO_chair -0.057* 0.067 0.246* -0.071* 0.067 0.246* -0.031 0.067 0.246* -0.034* 0.067 0.246* -0.324 -0.316 0.589*** 
 (0.090) (0.669) (0.136) (0.084) (0.669) (0.136) (0.023) (0.669) (0.136) (0.021) (0.669) (0.136) (0.017) (0.913) (0.201) 
CEO_internal -0.113 -0.775 -0.270 -0.131 -0.775 -0.270 -0.050 -0.775 -0.270 -0.052 -0.775 -0.270 -0.479 -0.311 -0.743*** 
 (0.140) (0.940) (0.192) (0.130) (0.940) (0.192) (0.035) (0.940) (0.192) (0.032) (0.940) (0.192) (0.085) (1.069) (0.233) 
Big4 -0.012   0.081   -0.037   -0.017   1.272   
 (0.224)   (0.209)   (0.057)   (0.052)   (1.150)   
Risk_disclosure -0.009   -0.069   0.013   0.002   -0.739   
 (0.138)   (0.128)   (0.035)   (0.032)   (0.561)   
1/z 0.089***   0.067***   0.013***   0.010***   -0.085   
 (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.124)   
EQTA -0.115   -0.066   0.035   0.024   0.829   
 (0.226)   (0.210)   (0.057)   (0.052)   (1.340)   
NLTA 0.065   0.079   0.002   -0.001   0.703   
 (0.104)   (0.097)   (0.026)   (0.024)   (0.583)   
log_TA -0.003   -0.002   -0.001   -0.000   -0.050   
 (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.092)   
lnGDP_percapita -0.010   0.006   0.001   0.002   0.092   
 (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.136)   
Muslim_population 0.002***   0.003***   0.001***   0.001***   0.004   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005)   
Inflation -0.004   -0.003   -0.001   -0.001   0.018   
 (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.031)   
Constant -0.146 9.677*** 0.881*** -0.277 9.677*** 0.881*** -0.041 9.677*** 0.881*** -0.062 9.677*** 0.881*** 0.628 9.609*** 0.952*** 
 (0.286) (0.288) (0.142) (0.266) (0.288) (0.142) (0.072) (0.288) (0.142) (0.066) (0.288) (0.142) (1.313) (0.400) (0.208) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 602 
R-squared 0.442 0.003 0.090 0.237 0.003 0.090 0.064 0.003 0.090 0.013 0.003 0.090 0.240 0.067 0.047 
Chi2 169.73*** 17.05*** 13.94*** 108.23*** 17.05*** 13.94*** 55.82*** 17.05*** 13.94*** 62.30*** 17.05*** 13.94*** 44.26*** 12.19** 15.81*** 
 
 
